Research
Research Interests
Research Interests
I work on a broad class of problems coming from general equilibrium theory, game theory and the applications of these theories. In particular, I pursue my interest in understanding economic interactions by solving existing problems, developing new models to integrate intuitions from diverse literatures, and proposing new questions based on real-world observations. [Statement]
I work on a broad class of problems coming from general equilibrium theory, game theory and the applications of these theories. In particular, I pursue my interest in understanding economic interactions by solving existing problems, developing new models to integrate intuitions from diverse literatures, and proposing new questions based on real-world observations. [Statement]
Working Papers
Working Papers
Small Group Cooperation in Games and Economies, Job Market Paper
Small Group Cooperation in Games and Economies, Job Market Paper
Small Income Effects in Economies with a Large Number of Commodities and Patient Consumers
Small Income Effects in Economies with a Large Number of Commodities and Patient Consumers
Walrasian Tatonnement Stability near Autarchy without Differentiability and Interiority
Walrasian Tatonnement Stability near Autarchy without Differentiability and Interiority
Second Order Secret Love
Second Order Secret Love
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- Sometimes, when choosing among strategies that maximize their own payoff, agents choose the strategy that is best for their friends. To study this phenomenon, we study games with lexicographic externalities. The novel ingredient is a set of players’ preference lists, which represent the order in which players care about the others. The collection of preference lists maps a base game to a game with a lexicographic externality, in which payoff functions are vector-valued and agents compare outcomes according to the lexicographic order. We prove that, for any given preference lists, if the base game has discrete outcomes and upper semi-continuous payoff functions, a Nash equilibrium always exists. In addition, we discuss the efficiency of equilibria in a model with public bads and the epsilon-variations of our formalization.