Research Interests

I work on a broad class of problems coming from general equilibrium theory, game theory and the applications of these theories. In particular, I pursue my interest in understanding economic interactions by solving existing problems, developing new models to integrate intuitions from diverse literatures, and proposing new questions based on real-world observations. [Statement]

Working Papers

Market Segmentation - Small Group Cooperation in Games and Economies, Job Market Paper

  • [PDF] [Hide Abstract]
  • In this paper, we study games and exchange economies with transferable utility and a continuum of agents, who may be of different types and can interact only in small groups.
  • Firstly, we study a game with a continuum of agents who form small groups in order to share group surpluses. Group sizes are exogenously bounded by natural numbers or percentiles. We prove that there exists a stable assignment, where no group of agents can jointly do better. Conceptually, our work provides the only existence result to this problem on our level of generality as well as a uniform way to understand diverse solution concepts, such as stable matching, fractional core, f-core, and epsilon-sized core. Computationally, when there are finitely many types of players and group sizes are finite, we reduce the number of unknowns in the problem of finding stable assignments from about IN to about I, where I is the number of player types, N is the maximum size of the small group and I is much larger than N. We achieve this reduction by reformulating the welfare maximization problem as a symmetric transport problem.
  • Secondly, we study an exchange economy with finitely many goods and a continuum of agents who can exchange commodities only within small groups of some bounded finite sizes. By introducing the idea of a nonlinear price in which expenditures on traded quantities are defined by the same nonlinear function in every group, we prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium with a potentially nonlinear market price, provided that agents have quasi-linear utility functions. It appears that only nonlinear market prices are compatible with models in which all trade surplus might go to one of the trading parties. Therefore, our result suggests that market segmentation might lead to price nonlinearity. This work fills in gaps in the work of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989) on economies with small groups of arbitrary finite sizes.

Small Income Effects in Economies with a Large Number of Commodities and Patient Consumers

Walrasian Tatonnement Stability near Autarchy without Differentiability and Interiority

Second Order Secret Love